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Photos courtsey of NOAA

By Pat Pape

The hurricane season is now a memory. Many evacuees are moving back to their homes along the Gulf Coast, and retailers and restaurants are slowly re-opening their businesses. While the news media and politicians debate the quality of governmental response, facility experts are reviewing what they learned from the storms that devastated parts the country during 2005.

Facilities in several states played a role in the unexpected drama, but much of the learning comes from the New Orleans Superdome and Hurricane Katrina, the fifth worst storm ever recorded in the Atlantic basin and the most expensive natural disaster in U.S. history.

Even before Hurricane Katrina had made land, New Orleans city officials had designated several local buildings, including the 1.9-million-square-foot Louisiana Superdome, as “refuges of last resort.” Many area residents were either without means to leave New Orleans or had hoped to sit out the storm. Then, nearby levees failed and flood waters poured into the Crescent City, and very quickly the Superdome filled with people. Some of them were rescued by authorities from rooftops and flooded homes and then transported to the facility. Others simply made their way to the Superdome in search of shelter. Before the skies had cleared, the 30-year-old Superdome was housing as many as 10,000 displaced residents at one time.

Opened in August, 1975, the Superdome was dubbed “The Crown Jewel of the New Orleans Skyline.” It was constructed to withstand storms of up to 200 mph, but on Aug. 29, 2005, when winds from Hurricane Katrina reached 145 mph, two holes were torn in the facility’s roof. In addition, the building’s air conditioning and electricity failed. Toilets didn’t work, and running water was not available, a combination that created unsanitary and uncomfortable conditions. Most of the Superdome’s temporary residents were eventually moved to other shelters in other states, but facility industry leaders want to ensure they know how to avoid the Superdome’s problems in the future.

Looking ahead, Don Grinberg, FAIA, director of Convention Center Architecture for HNTB Architecture in Boston, believes revised building codes typically play a major role in making newly constructed structures safer during hurricanes, earthquakes, tornadoes and even manmade disasters, such as fires.

“Florida is a prime example of this,” he said. “If you go look back, you’ll see there have been significant changes in the (Florida) building codes as a result of the history of storms there.”

Photos courtsey of Louisiana Superdome

One prime example of that is devastating Hurricane Andrew, which destroyed or damaged 173,000 homes and caused approximately $30 billion in damage in 1992. Afterwards, South Florida authorities toughened both local building codes and code enforcement.

“Of course, using a facility as a physical refuge is a whole other dimension,” Grinberg said. “These buildings have enormous kitchens and assembly space, but they’re not designed for people to be lodged there.”

Greg Davis, director of the CAJUNDOME in Lafayette, La., has seen this situation first hand. Located about 135 miles from New Orleans, the CAJUNDOME and Convention Center didn’t suffer the physical damage of the Superdome; however, the facility served as a shelter for evacuees by housing a total of 17,000 displaced people over a 58-day period. In a single night, the CAJUNDOME received 2,700 incoming evacuees, who arrived in more than 60 buses, while members of the national news media crowded around the facility filing reports on the disaster.

“At one time, we had 7,000 people here,” Davis said. “Our facility is 20 years old, and this is the first time we’ve had to do anything like that. But we came out just fine. There were no major problems.”

Because stadiums and convention centers are typically owned by state or local governments, it is unlikely that additional funds will be spent on other existing structures to make them more resistant to a future hurricane or to convert it into a more efficient emergency shelter.

“Even before Hurricane Katrina, the State of Louisiana was having financial difficulties,” Davis said. “It would cost millions of dollars to upgrade (this facility) as a shelter. Where would you get the money?”

“These buildings are not equipped to be an evacuation shelter or a refuge of last resort,” said Paul Griesemer of Ellerbe Becket, one of four firms working to restore the Superdome to its pre-hurricane condition. ”They’re strong structures, but they’re not prepared to house people without backup services.”

Ellerbe Becket recently completed an engineering and operating systems analysis of the Superdome, which is available for review on the Superdome Web site at www.superdome.com/site19.php.

“We’re getting to the final scope of the project,” said Griesemer, architectural director. “We hope that the New Orleans Saints will be playing football in the Superdome by November 2006.”

Because of the unpredictable forces of nature, the best plan for facility managers in the future is to be prepared for emergencies and to be a key player, along with state and local authorities, in emergency preparation planning.

“The onus is on building managers to plan ahead, and ideally the design of the building should be part of the plan,” Grinberg said. “What is the role of the kitchen and its function? What is the role of the food service provider in light of the temporary residents that need to be served?

“One of the lessons here is that disaster response needs to be interdisciplinary, with all entities working together to make that happen. From my perspective, I think that the facility managers understand that and are working to that end,” he said.

Davis added that the expertise of the seasoned facility manager – dealing with large crowds – is instrumental in disaster planning on a state or local level.

“As an industry, we need to reach out to the Red Cross, to Homeland Security and to FEMA and get them to embrace the facility manager as an integral part of a disaster plan,” he said. “There should be a formal relationship, and we must all understand the chain of command. The role of the facility manager needs to be articulated, understood and agreed upon.”

Pat Pape is a freelance writer in Dallas, TX.

 

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